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Cameroonian Schutztruppe Soldiers in
Spanish-Ruled Fernando Po during the
First World War: A ‘Menace to
the Peace’?1
JACQUELINE DE VRIES
Faculty of Arts, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
When the German forces were ousted from Cameroon in early 1916, they
fled south to neutral Spanish Guinea. Tens of thousands of Cameroonians
joined them. Over 20,000 African soldiers and hangers-on were eventually
accommodated by the Spanish authorities on the island Fernando Po, off
the Cameroonian coast. Despite mounting Allied pressure on Spain to dis-
band and repatriate the troops, they remained on the island until after
armistice. They were largely under German control, and received military
training during their internment. The delayed repatriation of Cameroonian
soldiers, in 1919, had a pronounced effect on their communities at home.
KEYWORDS Cameroon, First World War, Fernando Po, Schutztruppe,
African troops
When I was researching Christian missions and British colonial rule in Kom, in
the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon, I was surprised to learn that the
vibrant Catholic community in this area had been founded not by European
missionaries, but by local converts. Prominent among the Christian pioneers
were former soldiers who had enlisted with the German armed forces
(Schutztruppe) during the First World War and had been interned on Fernando
Po, a Spanish Guinean island off the coast of Cameroon. In Kom, the Catholic
campaign was led by former recruit Michael Timneng and a small but deter-
mined group of fellow ex-soldiers. Descendants of these former fighters
recalled with pride the wartime activities of their forefathers. Little reference
1 National Archives, London (henceforth NAL) CO649/10-4.3.16/10634, Brigadier General Dobell to
Chief of Imperial General Staff, 4.2.1916.
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was made to combat: returning home unscathed had shown the converts to be
victorious. Instead, the fact that these ex-soldiers could speak German
impressed my informants. Some mentioned uniforms and German-language
catechisms, still in their possession, brought back from Fernando Po by the
returning soldiers.soldiers.2 I soon learned that in many other Grassfields vil-
lages, ex-Schutztruppe soldiers had played leading roles in the establishment
of Christian communities and schools, in the face of fierce opposition from
both traditional leaders and the British colonial administration.3 For people in
the Grassfields, the repatriation of the troops from Fernando Po perhaps
altered power relations more tangibly than the transition from German to
British rule did.
When the Germans were ousted by Allied forces from Cameroon in January
1916, they retreated to neighbouring neutral Spanish Guinea. Thousands of
Cameroonian Schutztruppe soldiers and carriers accompanied them on a harrow-
ing jungle trek to Bata, the administrative capital. They travelled with wives, car-
riers and servants in tow, in some cases with entire villages loyal to the Germans.4
Over 40,000 people sought refuge under the Spanish flag. Half were sent straight
back to Cameroon, to prevent famine on the Spanish Rio Muni coast.5 Among the
20,000 who made it to Bata were 6000 Schutztruppe combatants.6 British and
French authorities were disturbed by the presence of a large, disgruntled and rest-
less enemy force on the West African coast, and pressed the Spanish government to
disband the troops and to intern the German nationals in Spain. Instead, over
18,000 Cameroonians and a thousand Germans were transferred to Fernando Po.
The island’s population more than doubled.
Most of the Germans were later interned in Europe, but the Cameroonians were
held on Fernando Po until well after the close of the war. The encampment of the
German-Cameroonian troops and their followers only forty kilometres from
2 C. Geary, ‘Ludwig Brandl's historical notes on the kingdom of Kom,’ Paideuma, 26 (1980), 71; I.
Stokman, ‘Kan een heiden 't geloof verbreiden?,’ Annalen der St. Joseph's Congregatie, 39:6 (1928), 86.
3 J. Nielen, A Short History of Wum Parish (s.l., 1971); H. Skolaster, Die Pallotiner in Kamerun: 25 Jahre
Missionsarbeit (Limburg a.d. Lahn, 1924); J. Plissonneau, ‘Souvenirs de l'Adamaoua,’ La Regne (Revue
des Pre^tres du Sacre Coeur, 1937–1939).
4 Hundreds of Yaounde chiefs and their followers joined the Germans to escape reprisals by the Allies.
See: P. Laburthe-Tola, ‘Charles Atangana (c. 1882–1943), un chef Camerounais entre deux colo-
nisations,’ Mondes et Cultures 58:2/4 (1998), 108–18; F. Quinn, ‘An African reaction to World War I:
The Beti of Cameroon,’ Cahiers d' Etudes Africaines, 13:52 (1973), 722–31; F. Quinn, ‘The impact of
the First World War and its aftermath on the Beti of Cameroun,’ in Africa and the First World War, ed.
by M. Page (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), 171–85.
5 Some contemporary accounts show inflated figures. The numbers presented here reflect data from vari-
ous published and archive sources, most of which are discussed below.
6 Large groups of non-combatants typically accompanied Schutztruppe companies. The German Colonel
Rammstedt, for example, trekked to Bata with 17 Europeans, 145 native troops, 335 messengers, serv-
ants, craftsmen, carriers and horseboys, and 390 women, children and other relatives: F. Rammstedt,
‘Krieg und Schutztruppe,’ in Kamerun: dargestellt in kolonialpolitischer, historischer, verkehrstech-
nischer, rassenkundlicher und rohstoffwirtschafflicher Hinsicht, ed. by W. Kemner (Berlin: Hermann
Hilliger, 1941), 85–7. F. Lange explained the system in Massa, wann kommst du wieder? Zwischen
Tschadsee und G€otterberg. Erlebnisse im Kampf um Kamerun (D€usseldorf: V€olkischer Verlag,
1942), 19–20.
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the Cameroonian coast caused the Allies great anxiety. The naval significance of
the island was obvious. The soldiers’ camps could hardly be considered wartime
internment, and German officers continued to drill the troops. Weaponry was
smuggled into Spanish territory, clearly with Spanish connivance. German and
Spanish armed forces and civil administration not only fraternised, but appeared to
operate as one. British pressure on Spanish authorities to repatriate the troops had
no effect. Rather, the Governor General and the Spanish officers turned a blind eye
to what was clearly a German attempt to establish a military base off the West
African coast.
The retreat to Spanish Muni
Many who followed the Germans into Spanish Guinea were inspired by loyalty to
the Germans.7 Others fled to avoid maltreatment by the French or the British—or
the Germans, should they return.8 Some hoped to be sent to theatres of war in
Europe. The German governor in Cameroon, Ebermaier, promised that loyalty to
the Germans came with advantages: ‘You natives, who have lived with the
Germans for a generation, know that the Germans are strict, but just. Those of you
who help our enemy (… ) will experience our severity. But those who remain loyal
to us will be rewarded.’9 Cameroonian soldiers and government officials loyal to
the Germans were exempted from corporal punishment, for ‘he who serves the
Germans faithfully will be treated like a German, and share in the privileges of
the Germans.’10
Whatever their reasons for joining the retreating columns, few could have antici-
pated the difficulties of the trek. The journey involved 10–12 days of 10–12-hr mar-
ches through ‘unbelievably difficult terrain,’ according to German Commander
Zimmerman, with countless rivers and creeks, mountains and then swamps.11 ‘The
7 K.W.H. Koch, Im Tropenhelm. Kriegstagebuch eines Kamerunk€ampfers (Du€sseldorf: Fl€oder, 1931);
Lange; Rammstedt; A. Ritter, Frieden und Krieg in Kamerun: Ein Erlebnisbericht (Suhl: Strom, 1939); J.
Scholze, Deutsches Heldentum am Kameruner G€otterberg: Allerlei Weltkriegspalaver (Offenburg: A.
Reiff, 1934). But German troops at Garua (Northern Cameroon) mutinied: Bundesarchiv Berlin-
Lichterfelde (henceforth BBL) R1001/3991, Auszug aus einem Bericht unseres Gesch€aftsf€uhrers aus
Spanien vom Juni 1916.
8 Thousands did not follow the Germans. Many deserted en route: fear was widespread that men would
be forced to work on Fernando Po plantations, and women left behind (NAL/CO649/2-7.6.15, Dobell
to Harcourt (SoS), 10.5.1915). Also: H. P€urschel, Die Kaiserliche Schutztruppe f€ur Kamerun: Gef€uge
und Aufgabe (Berlin: Junker & D€unnhaupt, 1936). Over 20,000 people, mostly carriers, fled (or were
sent back) from Muni, reaching a British refugee camp at Campo destitute and famished. Food depots
at Campo, Kribi and Duala provided for the refugees: NAL/CO649/8-17.7.16/33686, Report on Naval
and Combined Naval & Military Operations in the Cameroons, 12.6.1916. The wartime British admin-
istration worried about ex-Schutztruppe soldiers roaming the countryside fully armed: Buea National
Archives (henceforth BNA) Ab1915/41, station diary Bamenda (Podevin). District Officer Podevin
promised ‘very serious penalties’ for possession of arms or ammunition ‘especially in case of ex-German
soldiers’ (BNA/Cf1915/1, Podevin to Lt. Governor at Lagos, n.d.).
9 Quoted in Ritter, 9.
10 Kamerun Post, 12.8.1914, Extrablatt 12, cited in Foreign Office, ‘Treatment of Natives in the German
Colonies,’ in Handbooks no. 132b (London: HMSO, 1919).
11 E. Zimmerman, Meine Kriegsfahrt von Kamerun zur Heimat (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein, 1915), 150–1.
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jungle was crammed with people,’ one observer recalled. ‘Chiefs and their subjects,
men and women and their children in long caravans (… ) [and] many Hausa with
heavily laden donkeys (… ) and then again more soldiers, carriers, and groups of
natives.’12 The refugees faced traps, poisonous spears, swamps, thieves, and corp-
ses. The further they marched, the more difficult it became to obtain food: every-
thing had been eaten or destroyed by earlier convoys, and it was too dangerous to
venture into villages to seek supplies. Caravans were commonly attacked—perhaps
by levies armed by the British, perhaps by hostile indigenes angered by the invasion
of their land—necessitating detours and exacerbating food shortages.13 The thou-
sands of unarmed carriers—usually forced labour, and often prisoners of war—
were easy targets.14 Although compelled to relinquish their weapons at the border,
the German officers were able to obtain high-quality Spanish weapons and ammu-
nition, and the troops retained their spears and cutlasses. Guerrilla warfare,
ambushes, illness, hunger and exhaustion took lives on all sides.15 What was once
verdant forest had become wasteland, with even the smallest villages raided and
destroyed to avenge the insurrection of unwilling chiefs, farms emptied and bridges
demolished, whether by passing troops or by locals.16 One author commented that
the suffering en route to Muni was worse than any of the suffering he witnessed in
the Cameroons campaign.17 Thousands arrived in Bata destitute, disheartened
and famished.
The Germans had good reason to expect a warm welcome from the authorities
in Spanish Guinea. German firms had cocoa plantations and trading houses both
on Fernando Po and on the mainland, and their agents were prominent among the
merchant population. Before the war, Germany had enjoyed special privileges on
Spanish Fernando Po in the form of a high-powered wireless transmission station,
which it continued to use with Spanish connivance after the outbreak of war. In the
early stages of the war, arms, ammunition, funds and provisions were smuggled to
Cameroon via Spanish Muni. Convoys of rowboats and steamers under Spanish
flag carried German mail and passengers between Bata and German stations on the
Cameroon coast, evading the Allies’ maritime blockade.18
Initially, the influx of thousands of people meant good business for the Bata mer-
chants. German marks, French francs, Belgian and English coins garnered from
12 E. Student, Kameruns Kampf 1914–16 (Berlin: Bernard & Gr€afe, 1937), 324.
13 Lange, 219; G. K€uhnhold, In Friedens- und Kriegszeiten in Kamerun (Berlin: Scherl, 1917), 40–60;
P€urschel, 57–81; Ritter, 255–63; H. Skolaster, Krieg im Busch: Selbsterlebtes aus dem Kamerunkrieg
(Limburg a.d. Lahn: Pallotiner, 1918), 135–9; Student, 324–32.
14 Rammstedt, 84.
15 Lange, 219; Student, 325.
16 K€uhnhold, 52.
17 Scholze, 226.
18 J. Osuntokun, ‘Anglo-Spanish relations in West Africa during the First World War’, Journal of the
Historical Society of Nigeria 7:2 (1974), 292. NAL/CO649/3, CO649/4 and CO649/5 hold reports of
arms smuggling. The British consul at Barcelona reported (Feb. 1915) sugar, rice, meat and pumps, des-
tined for trans-shipment to Bata and thence to Cameroon for the German forces (NAL/CO649/3-4.2.15/
5826, Telegram Consul General Smith, 4.2.1915). Later 200 cases of cartridges, hidden in cocoa cylin-
ders, were unloaded on Fernando Po under cover of darkness (NAL/CO649/3-1.9.15/40350, Consul
Wilson to CO, 20.6.1915).
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wages and raids were all readily accepted by the Spanish merchants.19 But supplies
soon fell far short of what was needed to feed the swelling encampments of
exhausted, hungry refugees. The Allies partially lifted the coastal blockade to
enable food shipments from Fernando Po to Bata, but soon shortages of food,
water and housing caused widespread illness and social unrest, with ‘appalling mis-
ery’ as a result.20 Coastal communities and inhabitants of the Spanish Guinean
island Corisco were compelled to contribute food to alleviate famine in Bata, to no
avail.21 Raids of neighbouring villages by re-armed Schutztruppe companies in
search of food contributed to the general insecurity.
The combination of famine, demoralisation and uncertain prospects in over-
crowded army camps worried the British authorities. The Senior Naval Officer
(SNO) in Douala noted that the Spanish armed forces in Muni were too few and
too weak to handle the situation, and questioned the neutrality of the Spanish
authorities.22 The British urged that the African refugees be repatriated at the first
opportunity, and the Germans be interned in Europe. But the Spanish Governor
General, Angel Barrera, was reluctant to let go what was potentially an enormous
labour force. Since the establishment of cocoa and coffee plantations on Fernando
Po in the late nineteenth century, labour shortages had plagued the Fernando Po
administration. The local population refused to work on the plantations, and plan-
tation labour from Cameroon and Nigeria fell far short of demand.23
After brief negotiations, Barrera announced his intention, ‘with a view to
preventing famine in Muni,’ to intern the German troops on Fernando Po,
together with their followers and all European refugees, with the exception of
missionaries and medical professionals.24 In exchange he extracted a commit-
ment that ships sailing between Fernando Po and Bata would not be subjected
to inspection.25 From Fernando Po, the Europeans would be transferred to
Cadiz for internment.
This was not what the British had hoped for. The large contingent of German
officers caused unease, especially in light of Barrera’s ‘enthusiastic panegyric of the
Germans.’26 As to the troops, Brigadier General Dobell, in charge of Anglo-French
forces, pointed out that international law provided no grounds for their detention.
But Barrera insisted that ‘it would be a breach of his neutrality if he allowed them
to return home before the end of the war.’27 Whether neutrality was Barrera’s
19 Koch, 270.
20 ‘Ojeada,’ LGE, XIII:3 (10.2.1916), 35. The maritime blockade was lifted in March 1916.
21 ‘Correspondencia,’ LGE, XIII:6 (25.3.1916), 70.
22 NAL/CO640/8-.2.16/5944, SNO Douala to Admiralty, 5.2.1916.
23 Recruitment methods and working conditions resembling slavery had led to British restriction of labour
recruitment from the mainland. I.K. Sundiata, ‘The rise and decline of Kru power: Fernando Po in the
nineteenth century,’ Liberian Studies Journal, VI:I (1975), 38. Also Chapter 7, ‘The search for labor’, in
I. Sundiata, From Slaving to Neoslavery (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 119–45.
24 NAL/CO649/8-17.7.16/33686, Operations in the Cameroons, 12.6.1916 (Fuller).
25 NAL/CO640/8-7.2.16/5944, SNO Douala to Admiralty, 5.2.1916.
26 NAL/CO649/16-8.2.18/7358, Memorandum from FO (1918).
27 NAL/CO649/10-4.3.16/10634, Dobell to CIGS, 4.3.1916.
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prime concern is questionable. Rather, Dobell believed, the Governor anticipated
payment for transporting and maintaining the German troops.28
‘God squeezes but he does not suffocate’29
With hunger and disease rampant in mainland Spanish Guinea, the evacuation of
refugees to Fernando Po was welcomed both by the internees and by those remain-
ing behind in Bata. But the transfer was slow. Only three small ships were available,
and passengers had to be rowed in small boats to the steamers off the coast.30 Coal
shortages curtailed the frequency of sailings.31 The first German troops left Bata in
February, but people were still being shipped to Fernando Po half a year later.32
The British consul speculated that Barrera was delaying the evacuation of the
German forces from Bata because he lacked the forces to control the African
troops. ‘If their German masters are all taken from Bata and some thousands of the
native troops remain,’ he wrote, ‘they are quite likely to get out of hand, and if they
make for the bush in the hope of getting back to Cameroon the unrest amongst the
Pangwes would probably increase.’33
Among the first refugees to reach Fernando Po were German Governor
Ebermaier and Commander Zimmerman. The welcome offered Ebermaier by
Barrera fuelled British doubts regarding Spanish neutrality. A local correspond-
ent reported:34
For nineteen months, the brave German defenders held their positions (… ) At last,
owing to lack of resources, and extricating themselves out of immense difficulties,
these men of iron (… ) took refuge under our flag (… ) Yesterday, 160 Germans left
Bata. They arrived here today on the steamer Manuel L. Villaverde, and together
with their most esteemed Governor and invincible Captain Karl Ebermaier are
placing themselves under the protection of our Excellency the Governor General
(… ) Our highest authority presented himself at the quay to receive His Eminence
(… ) He was greeted on arrival at the wharf by the bands and cornets playing the
Spanish Royal March. He [Ebermaier] returned, with obvious feeling, the salute
which our flag gave him (… ) With considerable foresight our First Authority had
already placed Government House at Basile at his disposal, and to these heights the
gallant Mr Ebermaier went that same evening. (… ) Mr Ebermaier tasted the bread
of tears when his subjects were disgraced and killed and is now eating the bread of
28 Ibid.
29 ‘Ojeada,’ LGE, XIII:8 (25.4.1916), 95.
30 Koch, 282.
31 NAL/CO649/8-17.4.16/18081, Fuller to Admiralty, 9.3.1916.
32 The (non-combatant) Yaounde left the mainland last: they had been temporarily resettled by the Spanish
government south of Bata. See: Ein Werk Deutscher Kolonisation auf Fernando Poo, Mitteilungsblatt
des Traditionsverbandes Ehemaliger Schutz- und €Uberseetruppen/Freunde der Fr€uheren Deutschen
Schutzgebiete E.V. (Berlin: Traditionsverband ehemaliger Schutz- und €Uberseetruppen, 1983), 5.
33 NAL/CO649/8-17.4.16/18081, Frank Wilson, 7.3.1916. The term Pangwe refers to the largest indigen-
ous group in Spanish Muni, also known as Fang.
34 ‘Ojeada’, LGE, XIII:4 (25.2.1916), 46–47.
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exile in a foreign land (… ) yet he had the courage and strength to climb the steep
slopes of Basile without even having to wipe the perspiration from his brow.
The population of Fernando Po more than doubled due to the internment. In
Santa Isabel alone, the population increased from about 2500 inhabitants to over
18,000.35 The influx of so many potential labourers and consumers was welcomed,
and a Fernandian newspaper speculated that the internment might enable the devel-
opment of local agriculture, ‘in such need of strong arms.’36 Santa Isabel, already a
multi-ethnic commercial centre, benefited from the hustle and bustle. German refu-
gees were lodged in schools, shops, and even the market.37 Warehouses were made
available at the waterfront, houses and tents were built for the Europeans, and
large camps outside town housed the troops. For merchants and traders on the
island, this was a golden era. Germans and Cameroonians alike had money which
they were eager to spend. Germans had smuggled savings out of Cameroon, and
the troops received money for food and supplies from the German government. In
addition, troops were paid wages that had been pending due to shortages of
German money in Cameroon.38 After months of isolation and deprivation, one
observer reported, ‘every European is resplendent in his new outfit.’39 Troops
seized the opportunity to acquire food, clothing and small luxuries such as pipes,
tobacco and mouth organs. The main square at Santa Isabel became a colourful
meeting place, where the army band played to an enthusiastic crowd. The
Europeans entertained themselves at parties, and managed to drink the island’s
entire supply of wine and beer in a few weeks’ time.40
As on the mainland, demand soon surpassed supply. The extensive cocoa planta-
tions provided no food, and local production was scant. The island depended heav-
ily on imports, but wartime conditions at sea impeded the delivery of provisions.
Over 5000kg of rice was required daily to feed the camps near Santa Isabel alone.41
Starting in March, over 125 tonnes of food were imported monthly, but because
there were no stocks a shipping delay of only a few weeks led to serious short-
ages.42 Food quickly became scarce for Europeans, for the troops, and for the peo-
ple of Fernando Po alike. Rampant inflation went hand in hand with speculation
and hoarding. Food prices increased fivefold in a few months’ time.43 People
hunted for small game, lobster, crab and other seafood, and coconuts were requisi-
tioned from the Spanish Guinean island Corisco. Hungry internees bought the last
35 J. Vicent, ‘ABC en Fernando Poo: Situacion de la colonıa,’ ABC, (9.8.1916), 6.
36 ‘Ojeada,’ LGE, XIII:8 (25.4.1916), 95.
37 J. Vicent, ‘ABC en Fernando Poo: La paz en Cameron,’ ABC, (29.5.1916), 5–7.
38 Rammstedt, 86; ‘Ante los problemas,’ LGE, XIII:11 (10.6.1916), 135–7.
39 K€uhnhold, 59.
40 Ritter, 266; Introduction to G. Tessmann, ‘Die Bubi auf Fernando Poo: V€olkerkundliche
Einzelbeschreibung eines Westafrikanischen Negerstammes. Herausgegeben von Prof. Fr. O. Rache’
(PhD thesis, 1923).
41 ‘Ojeada sobre la quincena: Vida Isabelina,’ LGE, XIII:11 (10.6.1916), 129.
42 J. Mercader, ‘Las subsistencias,’ LGE, XV:19 (10.10.1918), 173; Ein Werk Deutscher Kolonisation, 19.
43 Mercader, ‘Noticias de la quincena’; BBL/R1001/3930, ‘Klein Bococo bei San Carlos’, report by Head
Veterinarian Nordt, 1.4.1917.
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plantains and palm oil from villagers, until Governor Barrera decreed trade in local
food crops a government monopoly.44
Only a few months after their arrival, the once honoured guests from Cameroon
were described in the local press as a ‘plague of locusts’ dining at the ‘splendid
Fernandian table, which was hardly adequate for those already here.’45 Tension
inside and outside the internment camps rose, leading a Spanish missionary to
worry: ‘Not only are the arms of the newcomers not working to the advantage of
our economy, they may also one day be raised to plunge us into misery and fur-
ther disaster.’46
The camps
Upon arrival, the troops were directed to the outskirts of Isabel, to build two large
camps.47 The ex-combatants were grouped into the same company formations as
during active military service: 12 companies of 500 men per company.48 Each com-
pany further included between 700 and 800 women, children and servants, and 50
carriers. A small number of German officers and non-commissioned officers was
stationed in each camp.
Conditions in the first few months were appalling. Part of the land allotted
to the camps was a swampy area which flooded easily and was infested
with mosquitoes and other insects. Other parts were dense, dark wilderness.
For those who arrived in ill health, in particular, the food shortages and the
unfamiliar, humid climate were hazardous.49 Initially there was no housing for
the troops, and even the most elementary shelter could not be constructed
for lack of building materials, which had to be carried in from forests 15 km
away. Groups of 200–300 troops trekked uphill daily to collect headloads
of wood, bark, bamboo, palm branches, and other building supplies:
‘endless lines of people walking with huge loads of banana leaves, palm ribs
and cuttings that will form their meagre and miserable huts,’ a missionary
recorded.50 British agents observed ‘a good deal of sickness and deaths,’
and counted 1800 native troops on the sick list in September 1916.51
44 J. Vicent, ‘Los campementos Alemanes de internacion,’ ABC (29.11.1916), 31–5; J. Mercader,
‘Esperando,’ LGE, XV:18 (25.9.1918), 165-6; J. Mercader, ‘Se aleja el espectro del hambre,’ LGE,
XV:20 (25.10.1918), 181-2; J. Mercader, ‘Para tranquilidad publica,’ LGE, XV:21
(10.11.1918), 189–90.
45 ‘Las salpicaduras,’ LGE, XIII:10 (25.5.1916), 109–14.
46 ‘Ante los problemas,’ 135.
47 NAL/CO649/8-17.4.16/18081, translation of Ebermaier’s orders, 25.2.1916. The Yaounde built a camp
(Klein Bokoko, or Bococo) at San Carlos, on the east of the island: BBL/R1001/3930, report by Nordt,
1.4.1917. See also Ein Werk Deutscher Kolonisation.
48 Unless otherwise noted, details of the camps are derived from Ein Werk Deutscher Kolonisation, which
closely follows the Spanish original: J. Vicent, Una obra de colonizacion Alemana en Fernando Poo
(Madrid: Blass & Cia, 1920).
49 Skolaster, Krieg, 139.
50 Vicent, ‘Los campementos’; ‘Ojeada,’ LGE, XIII:8 (25.4.1916), 95.
51 NAL/CO649/8-23.8.16/40040, SNO Ruxton to Admiralty, 21.6.1916. Illness plagued European intern-
ees too: NAL/CO649/7-21.10.16/50462, Extract of report by SNO Phillimore, 6.9.1916.
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‘It was not uncommon,’ a missionary wrote, ‘to see emaciated, starving
people along the roadside.’52 Spanish army physicians complained that the
government, in the interest of economic gain, had overlooked the public
health consequences of displacing such a large number of people of various
ethnic backgrounds and age groups, and housing them, underfed, in
cramped conditions.53 Santa Isabel had no sewage system, and no clean
water supply. According to one estimate, 3000 internees ‘paid for their loyalty
[to the Germans] with death’ in the early months after the move to
Fernando Po.54
But within 6 months, the troops transformed the wilderness into organised, airy
settlements. In one, a road was constructed along the entire 1.5-km length of the
camp, lined on two sides with mango trees, both for shade and for fruit. The bush
was cleared to allow for light and a sea breeze. Farms were established on three
sides of the camp, with over 500 hectares of crops. Villages were laid out in tidy
and efficient grids, with a large, level drilling field and houses for Europeans in the
middle. Roads, paved with stones and lava sand and joined by bridges, connected
the camps. Dams and dykes protected the new villages and farms from the sea. At
first housing consisted of long barracks; these were later replaced by roomy houses
with verandas and separate kitchens. The camps soon had hospitals, churches, lea-
ther workshops and stables, tailors’ and carpentry workshops, and even designated
areas for recycling or burning refuse. Health care was entrusted to a few German
doctors, assisted by the interned priests Baumeister and Schuster.55
The internment was nominal. People were free to move about, and engaged in a
lively trade. Troops were permitted to visit Santa Isabel in small groups twice
weekly at designated times.56 Carriers and other non-combatants were put to work
on cocoa plantations in what amounted to ‘a grave scandal of forced labour’ in
British eyes.57 Daily life for the former combatants and their families revolved
around camp maintenance and construction, and the cultivation of food crops. The
food supply was augmented by game.58 After the first labour-intensive months,
daily military drills resumed. These were considered especially necessary for
the young, newly recruited troops, who lacked military training.59
52 ‘Ojeada sobre la quincena,’ LGE, XIII:12 (25.6.1916), 143.
53 R.M. Medina-Domenech, ‘Paludismo, explotacion y racismo cientifico en Guinea Ecuatorial
(1900–1939),’ in La Accion Medico-Social contra el Paludismo en la Espa~na Metropolitana y Colonial
del Siglo XX, ed. by E. Rodrıguez Oca~na and R. Ballester (Madrid: CSIC, 2003), 387–8.
54 Scholze, 226. The Yaounde people at Bokoko likewise suffered. Some 450 of the 2382 inhabitants in
March 1917 were sick: BBL/R1001/3930, report by Nordt, 1.4.1917.
55 The medical work of these priests was admired by Spanish medical personnel working in the camps in
1917. Baumeister and Schuster were credited with achieving a significant reduction in endemic disease
in the camps through their ‘magnificent labour’: M. Martinez Cerro, ‘El servicio sanitario en los campa-
mentos de internamiento de Alemanes en Fernando Poo durante la Primera Guerra Mundial. Meritoria
intervencion de la Sanidad Naval (1916–1918),’ Revista General de Marina (Instituto de Historia y
Cultura Naval), 228:2 (1995), 201.
56 Vicent, ‘Los campementos’.
57 NAL/CO649/8-17.4.16/18081, Fuller to Admiralty, 9.3.1916.
58 ‘Notas de Basile,’ LGE XV:11 (10.6.1918), 109.
59 Ein Werk, 22.
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Catholic missionaries, interned with the troops, organised doctrine classes and reli-
gious ceremonies in ‘dangerously overcrowded’ gatherings.60
For the first 6 months, the camps were closed to outsiders, but on an
August Sunday visitors were invited to admire what had been achieved.61
Guests were treated to dancing, games, refreshments, and an extensive tour.
German, Spanish and British observers alike were impressed by the well-organ-
ised camps, ‘a monument to German method, industry and ingenuity,’ accord-
ing to a British observer.62 But admiration readily gave way to uneasiness, for
it was clear that the camps were run by the Germans, and not by the Spanish.
German officers supervised labour, settled disputes, took care of the accounts
and arranged the distribution of supplies. Orders were given in German, or in
German and Spanish. Ebermaier had established an interim government at
Santa Isabel, and issued proclamations ‘as if the island belonged to them [the
Germans],’ the British consul complained.63
Internment camp or military base?
From the perspective of the British Commander Dobell, the presence of thou-
sands of trained recruits on Fernando Po was ‘a menace to the peace of the
Cameroons.’64 The mainland was an easy target for attack, he reasoned, and
with Spanish neutrality so apparently flimsy, German troops could easily be
supplied with arms and ammunition. He speculated that a German takeover of
Fernando Po would pose a new threat to the Allies, and convinced the Foreign
Office to press Spain to remove the German officers and NCOs from the
island. As a result, approximately 800 Germans were transferred to Spain in
April and May 1916.65
Still, hundreds of Germans remained, including at least eighty officers and 100
NCOs.66 To Dobell’s dismay, the troops continued their drilling under German
officers. ‘The men are clothed in brand new khaki uniforms with flat caps, belts
and ammunition pouches,’ a disgruntled official reported. ‘Their discipline is
perfect.’67 Initially the drills were conducted unarmed, but later the troops were
armed with weapons smuggled into the territory. At a military parade held in one
of the camps in October 1916, the German commander broadcast that soon the
60 F. Hennemann, Werden und Wirken eines Afrika-Missionars (Limburg a.d. Lahn: Pallotiner, 1922), 169;
Baumeister, ‘Vom Kriegs- und Missionsdienst unserer aus Kamerun vertriebenen Missionare,’ Das Reich
des Herzen Jesu, (1917), 245; C. Schuster, ‘Im Gefangenenlager auf Fernando Po,’ Das Reich, (1920).
61 Vicent, ‘Los campementos’.
62 NAL/CO649/8-20.11.16/55531, Stobart (DO Victoria Division) to Lugard, 16.10.1916.
63 NAL/CO649/8-17.4.16/18081, Frank Wilson, 7.3.1916.
64 NAL/CO649/10-4.3.16/10634, Dobell to CIGS, 4.3.1916.
65 NAL/CO649/8-17.7.16/33686, Operations in the Cameroons, 12.6.1916 (Fuller). Twenty of these
escaped from Spain a few months later: S. del Molino, Soldades en el Jardin de la Paz (Zaragoza:
Prames, 2009).
66 NAL/CO649/8-17.7.16/33686, Operations in the Cameroons, 12.6.1916 (Fuller). Intelligence reports
and later correspondence suggest higher numbers: NAL/CO 649/8-20.11.16/55531, Stobart (DO
Victoria Division) to CO, 18.10.1916; NAL/CO649/12-2.4.17/17336, Phillimore, 2.4.1917.
67 NAL/CO649/08-20.11.16/55531, Stobart (DO Victoria Division) to Lugard, 16.10.1916.
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Germans would return victorious to Cameroon, and that the British were being
beaten in Europe.68 The German-Cameroonian military presence on Fernando Po
far outnumbered that of the Spanish, who would be unable to prevent the Germans
from carrying out an attack on the mainland.
British and French diplomats in Madrid insisted that the Spanish government
make haste to repatriate the troops and remove the remaining German officers
from Fernando Po. Prime Minister Romanones conceded to Hardinge, the British
ambassador, that he ‘was most anxious to get rid of these black troops and their
German Officers. The maintenance of order among them (… ) was a matter of con-
siderable difficulty and anxiety to the Spanish authorities who seemed to doubt
their [the troops’] willingness to obey Spanish officers.’69 The Spanish Minister of
State, Amalio Gimeno, complained of the cost of maintaining the Cameroonian
troops and of the constant demands that fresh uniforms be supplied.70 The Spanish
cabinet regretted that Barrera had accommodated the German troops: their contri-
bution in terms of plantation labour proved disappointing, for the Cameroonians
refused to perform agricultural or manual labour .71
Having extracted from Romanones a commitment to repatriate the troops,
Hardinge proposed a gradual transition from German to Spanish leadership in
the camps. Specially selected Spanish officers were to be sent to the island,
ships for the transportation of German officers to Spain were made available,
and authorities on Fernando Po were instructed to ‘afford every facility for the
escape back to the mainland’ of the troops and their families.72 But the impact
of these efforts—mocked as ‘delightfully Spanish’ by the Colonial Office—was
minimal: most of the ‘replacement’ officers spoke no German and could not
communicate with the troops.73 In November, Spain reiterated its intention to
transfer the native rank and file to mainland Spanish Guinea, and to send the
German officers to Spain, but when Senior Naval Officer Phillimore asked
Barrera for passenger lists and shipping schedules, Barrera denied having
received instructions.74
Allied anxiety intensified when it transpired that arms and ammunition were being
smuggled, apparently with Spanish support, to Fernando Po and perhaps to main-
land Muni stores as well. Numerous intelligence reports pointed to the large-scale,
68 NAL/CO649/05-30.10.16/51937, War Office to FO, 28.10.1916.
69 NAL/CO649/7-21.10.16/50462, Hardinge to Viscount Grey, 12.8.1916.
70 NAL/CO649/9-31.8.16/41183, Hardinge to Grey, 17.8.1916.
71 NAL/CO649/7-21.10.16/50462, Hardinge to Grey, 12.8.1916; NAL/CO649/9-31.8.16/41183,
Hardinge to Grey, 17.8.1916.
72 NAL/CO649/7-21.10.16/50462, Hardinge to Grey, 12.8.1916; F. Romero Salvado, ‘Spain and the First
World War: Neutrality and crisis’ (PhD thesis, University of London, 1994), 146.
73 NAL/CO649/9-31.8.16/41183, British ambassador to Grey, 17.8.1916; NAL/CO649/7-21.10.16/50462,
Comments from CO re. Hardinge to Grey, 12.8.1916, and re. FO to Army Council, 23.8.1916.
74 NAL/CO649/16-2.1.18/FO841, Barrera to Phillimore, 28.10.1916, and Phillimore to Barrera,
28.10.1916. Also NAL/CO649/9-8.11.16/53599, Hardinge to FO, 6.11.1916; NAL/CO649/9-11.11.16/
54152, Hardinge to CO, 7.11.1916; NAL/CO649/16 8.2.18/7358, Memorandum from FO, n.d. (1918),
re. reports from Phillimore 1916–1917.
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well-organised re-armament of the troops.75 No attempt was made to keep the weap-
ons consignments secret: German troops cleaned weapons (unguarded) at the Public
Works Department thrice weekly.76 Captain Phillimore furthermore surmised—cor-
rectly, as it turned out—that the Germans also possessed machine guns.’77
Barrera’s improbable insistence that the Germans had ‘not a single firearm in
their possession’ merely deepened British suspicion of him. Phillimore noted that
the Governor ‘was very anxious to return home in November. (… ) It is said that
he made a lot of money out of them [the German troops] and is anxious to get
away before trouble comes out of it and has probably arranged something with
them [the Germans] accordingly.’78 What was more, information from native secret
agents suggested that a German coup was being planned to coincide with
Barrera’s furlough.79
Were the interned Germans planning to attack the mainland? In July 1916,
Senior Naval Officer Ruxton considered a descent on the Cameroonian coast ‘quite
feasible but not likely at present,’ even if the Spanish stores of ammunition were
seized.80 But a few months later Stobart, the District Officer at Victoria
(Cameroon), considered an attack plausible, directly from Fernando Po or via
mainland Spanish Muni:
There are at least 6000 German soldiers (… ) drawing full pay and full rations (… )
A landing somewhere between Rio del Rey and Bata is quite feasible under the
present conditions. The interned ships are ready for sea, and having infringed the
law by the introduction of arms it is improbable that they [the German officers]
would hesitate to go a step further and seize one of the Spanish or Portuguese boats
which are frequently in the harbour. In numbers they [German forces] would be
greatly superior to the whole of the Franco-British forces in the Cameroons and it is
my considered opinion that should the Germans succeed in landing at some portion
of the coast between Kribi and Bata they would be favourably received by the
population, would receive ample supplies of food and carriers and would find a
totally insufficient force barring their way into the country (… ) My recent visit to
Fernando Po has led me to the opinion that the Germans are planning some definite
action and that any attempt which they may make will probably take place within
the next few months, if only as an alternative to the inevitable increase of unrest
among their troops (… ).81
75 Romero Salvado, 145. See: NAL/CO649/8-20.11.16 /55531, Stobart (DO Victoria Division) to Lugard,
16.10.1916; NAL/CO649/8-27.10.17/51522, SNO, 27.10.1916; NAL/CO649/5-30.10.16/51937,
Deputy Governor General Nigeria to SoS (CO), 27.10.1916; NAL/CO649/8-20.11.16/55531, Stobart to
Lugard, 18.10.1916.
76 A shipment of magazine rifles arrived from Spain soon after the exodus from Bata, in boxes marked as
food for the troops. When a box broke, exposing the rifles, Spanish customs officials stored the weapons
at the PWD: NAL/CO649/8-20.11.16/55531, Stobart to Lugard, 18.10.1916.
77 NAL/CO649/16-2.1.18/FO841, Report by Phillimore, 19.10.1916. Phillimore’s suspicions later
proved justified.
78 NAL CO649/16-2.1.18/FO841, Report by Phillimore, 19.10.1916.
79 NAL/CO649/5-30.10.16/51937, Deputy Governor General Nigeria to SoS (CO), 27.10.1916.
80 NAL/CO649/8-23.8.16/40040, SNO Ruxton to Admiralty, 21.7.1916.
81 NAL/CO649/5-30.10.16/51937, WO to FO, 28.10.1916.
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In another report, Stobart observed that there was little to prevent a German
takeover of Fernando Po:
The Germans – European and native – can hardly be said to be ‘interned’. Though
housed in various camps near Santa Isabel they are free to go wherever they like on
the island. They preserve their ordinary routine of military discipline (… ) (T)here is
as far as one can see no check whatever on the nature of their imports except that
of a corruptible Spanish customs officer (… ) The Germans are virtually in
possession of the town, as there are only one hundred Spanish native troops on the
island and the Spanish arsenal is guarded by six men. (… ) There is nothing, except
international considerations, to prevent the Germans getting possession of the island
by a coup d’etat, obtaining a certain quantity of arms and ammunition (… ) and
embarking a force of say 4000 men in the interned vessels or in ships lying in the
harbour (… ) The German native troops in such a case would follow their officers
who have them well in hand. (… ) Probably this is not their present intention,
although they must be perfectly aware that it is feasible. But their idea at present is
to retain composite forces ready to return to the Cameroons immediately on the
conclusion of hostilities. Events in Europe, however, depletion of troops from West
Africa, or some local trouble in any of the West African colonies might lead them
to entertain a scheme however desperate.82
These reports caused quite a stir at the War Office. The secretary of the
Army Council recalled the landing of contraband rifles and ammunition at
Fernando Po during the Cameroons campaign: these had probably not been
removed from the island since. Together with these arms, the newly reported
shipments ‘must clearly place the German force in a position to terrorize the
local Spanish officials.’83 The escape from Spain of a group of German
(ex-Cameroon) prisoners of war fuelled British disquiet regarding the possibility
of ‘dangerous action’ on Fernando Po, ‘where presumably the arrangements for
custody are likely to be less efficient than those in Spain.’84 A German coup
seemed likely. ‘And whilst the success of any such attempt would doubtless be
short-lived,’ the writer concluded dryly, ‘an incident of this nature would be
calculated to cause much unpleasantness.’85
Stobart’s conjectures proved remarkably accurate. In Massa, wann kommst
du wieder?, a German officer recalls plans to send a carefully chosen party of
African soldiers, commanded by white officers and armed to the teeth, in big
dugouts to the coast of Cameroon. The idea was that this small force would
inspire the frustrated population of Cameroon to rise up against the
British and the French.86 German records show that preparations for the
82 NAL/CO649/7-21.10.16/50462, Stobart to Lugard, 4.9.1916. This idea was not new. Kamerun
Governor Puttkamer earlier proposed to ‘acquire’ Fernando Po: J. von Puttkamer, Gouverneursjahre in
Kamerun (Berlin: Stilke, 1912), 250.
83 NAL/CO649/5-30.10.16/51937, WO to FO, 28.10.1916.
84 NAL/CO649/10-30.11.16/57482, Comments CO on escape of German POWs, 13.11.1916.
85 NAL/CO649/5-30.10.16/51937, WO to FO, 28.10.1916.
86 Lange, 222.
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remobilisation of troops on Fernando Po were underway in November 1916.87
Interim commander Rammstedt called for reports on the numbers of soldiers
fit for combat and the numbers of carriers available. Camp commanders tal-
lied firearms held by Europeans, as well as weapons held by the troops, includ-
ing machetes, axes large and small, knives, shovels and spades. Tents, cots,
mosquito nets for Europeans, belts, carrier equipment—all was counted and
registered. The commanders noted the numbers of soldiers who mastered
drum language (264), and the number of Europeans versed in Morse code and
light signalling. Military drilling was intensified.
Europeans received instructions to store a three-month supply of rations. Utmost
secrecy was urged. Rammstedt considered clerks and house staff likely spies, and
regarded native women with suspicion. Europeans not connected with the
Schutztruppe were to be kept in the dark. In the event of questions, Rammstedt
wrote, the explanation should be that these preparations were for re-occupation of
Cameroon after the peace agreements. Should Spain be drawn into the war, the
mobilisation efforts would be directed towards the defence of Fernando Po, rather
than toward a re-occupation of Cameroon.
The War Office got wind of Rammstedt’s plans. As a result of a ‘notion’ held by
the Allies, Barrera was instructed to have all German weapons and hunting gear
removed from the island. With great haste—and ample attention from the press—
he arranged the shipping of German-owned canons and machine guns to Cadiz.88
Captain Phillimore observed that this did not take care of the problem, for the con-
signments recently smuggled into the camps were left undisturbed.89 And scarcely
had Rammstedt’s mobilisation been called to a halt, when the Governor of French
Cameroun learned that a German coup was planned for January 1917.90 Allied
patience started to wear thin. The naval surveillance of the Santa Isabel port was
intensified, and France threatened to terminate the line of communication by
French steamship between Santa Isabel and Douala until the German officers were
removed from Fernando Po.91
German officers replaced by Spaniards
Barrera insisted that the German officers remain on Fernando Po to ensure discip-
line among the native troops. Problems were likely to arise after the removal of the
German officers, he conjectured. His opinion was shared by Major Gimenez Pidal,
commander of the Spanish troops. Spanish officers would need a year to become
acquainted, Pidal said. The sergeants were unsuited to replace their German
87 The remobilisation attempt is described in BBL/R1001/9524, Rammstedt to camp commanders Eymael,
von Heigelin and von Sommerfeld, 30.10.1916, and idem, 1.11.1916. Figures reported to Rammstedt:
BBL/R1001/9524, Statistik (Nov. 1916).
88 BBL/R1001/9524, Rammstedt to Eymael, von Heigelin and von Sommerfeld, 9.11.1916; ‘Ojeada,’LGE,
XIII:22 (25.11.1916), 263.
89 NAL/CO649/8-28.11.16/57241, SNO to Admiralty, 23.11.1916.
90 NAL/CO649/8-14.12.16/60044, Lugard to CO, 14.12.1916.
91 NAL/CO649/10-14.12.16/59931, WO to Admiralty, 13.12.1916; NAL/CO649/9-11.11.16/54048,
Hardinge to FO, n.d. (Nov. 1916).
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counterparts, and the corporals even less so, being illiterate.92 Nonetheless, in
response to continued Allied pressure, the Spanish Minister of State arranged in
January 1917 for some forty German officers, including Rammstedt and the camp
commanders Eymael, Heigelin and Sommerfeld, to be transferred to Spain.93
Although some 40 German officers remained on the island, most important officers
left. There appeared to be no intention, however, of sending the rank and
file anywhere.
Spanish officers and marine infantry were withdrawn from Larache (Morocco)
to maintain order in the camps. In addition to the commander and officers, 129 sol-
diers were sent to the island, three brass musicians, a drummer, a horse and a don-
key.94 Barrera’s worries regarding unrest amongst the troops proved well founded.
The presence of the Spanish troops meant 150 more mouths to feed, and friction
arose between the Schutztruppe soldiers and the Spanish troops.95 The latter were
accused of abusing their power, and of seducing women both in the camps and in
Santa Isabel. The Spanish officers tried to establish authority through harsh discip-
line and punishments deeply resented by the internees: beatings, imprisonment, and
even chains and pillory. Even women and children were flogged if they were consid-
ered disobedient.96 Tensions rose high. Rioting troops from the 8th company
stormed Santa Isabel ‘in protest against the brutal and savage treatment of one
Lieutenant Abramoski,’ and demanding to return to Cameroon. According to a
Spanish informant, commander Pidal inflicted ‘merciless, cruel punishment’ on
the rebels.97
Nearly a year after the exodus from Cameroon, the most influential German
leaders and a substantial amount of weaponry had been removed from Fernando
Po. Although the troops remained, Allied apprehensions regarding armed attack
abated somewhat. Other concerns came to the fore. Because of the prolonged mili-
tary threat from Fernando Po, the transfer of British troops from West Africa to
East Africa was delayed.98 British officials in Cameroon complained that the
lengthy internment of soldiers on Fernando Po fuelled the notion that the Germans
92 NAL/CO649/16-24.1.18/FO4454, Correspondence with ambassadors in Madrid and Paris, 24.1.1918.
93 NAL/CO649/9-18.11.16/55252, Reply from Spanish Min. of State, n.d.; NAL/CO649/12-2.4.17/17336,
Phillimore, 2.4.1917. Numerous influential Germans from Fernando Po were transferred to Spain but
not interned. In Madrid, Ebermaier led a German firm which maintained a radio-telegraphic connection
with the German War Office and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hardinge noted that the provision of such
facilities cast doubt on Spain’s neutrality: NAL/CO649/16-18.4.18/19068, Hardinge to Min. of
State, 2.3.1918.
94 J. Cervera Pery, ‘Presencia y esfuerzo: La infanterıa de marine en Guinea Ecuatorial,’ Revista General de
Marina (Instituto de Historia y Cultura Naval, (2012), 24; C. Font Gavira, ‘Tension et cautiverio,’ La
Gaceta de Guinea Ecuatorial, 189 (2013).
95 J. Vicent, ‘ABC en Fernando Poo: Consumatum est!,’ ABC (19.3.1917), 7–8.
96 NAL/CO649/16-24.1.18/FO4454, Correspondence with ambassadors, 24.1.1918; Font
Gavira, ‘Tension’.
97 NAL/CO649/16-24.1.18/FO4454, Correspondence with ambassadors, 24.1.1918. The file holds no fur-
ther information on the riot or on Lt. Abramoski’s plight.
98 NAL/CO649/7-21.10.16/50462, CO to FO, 28.10.1916. Lt. Gen. Smuts, anticipating troops from
Nigeria, had ‘already arranged to release the Indian troops urgently required by the War Office for
Egypt, and any delay in the arrival of the Nigerian troops would seriously embarrass him’. Also NAL/
CO649/5-30.10.16/51937, Deputy Governor General Nigeria to SoS, 27.10.1916.
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would return, impeding the establishment of effective British rule. The Bamenda
District Officer complained:
[N]one of the soldiers or carriers who belong to this Division and who were taken
to Fernando Po have been returned and until these men are released and sent back
to their homes, the present feeling of insecurity will remain. The Germans have no
doubt retained these men – or at any rate the carriers – with the specific objective
of creating such an impression. I think it may be safely assumed that enemy
influence in this country is very much more active than is generally supposed. It is
unreasonable to expect a people (… ) to sit down practically in sight of their lost
territory and not make every effort to keep themselves thoroughly posted with the
turn of affairs (… ). The indiscriminate manner in which enemy correspondence has
been circulated amongst natives in these territories and the procedure which has
been followed in discharging domestic servants from Fernando Po to wander up
from the coast themselves, ostensibly for the purpose of ‘returning to their homes’
is an example of how very simple it is for the Germans at Fernando Po to establish
a perfect system of intelligence and at the same time maintain their influence among
certain sections of the community besides creating an atmosphere of uneasiness and
an impression amongst the natives that their eventual return is to be regarded as a
possibility.99
Barrera under pressure
Another year on, no steps had been taken to repatriate the Cameroonians. It
seemed evident that Barrera was ‘in collusion with the Germans interned on that
island, and [was] making every effort to delay the execution of the arrangements
made with the Spanish government for the repatriation.’100 Captain Phillimore and
the governor of French Cameroun paid Barrera an unexpected visit in January
1918, hoping to enlist his cooperation. But while he was ‘much perturbed’ by the
joint visit and by the delay of a Spanish mail steamer held up for inspection at
Dakar, Barrera could not be convinced to focus on the repatriation:101
He started upon the question of arms at once, stated definitely that there were no
arms at all, that any attempt at a raid was ridiculous, and that even suggesting such
a thing was an insult to him, and all this was said before a word about arms had
been spoken (… ) It was impossible to say if he was speaking the truth, or had been
bought by the Germans, but I think the latter more probable.
Ambassador Hardinge in Madrid was directed to press for the removal of
Barrera from his post, as were the Spanish ambassadors in London and Paris.102
99 BNA/Cb1917/1, Report nr. 3, Bamenda Division (Podevin).
100 NAL/CO649/16-2.1.18/FO841, FO to Lord Bertie, Paris (draft), Jan. 1918.
101 NAL/CO649/16-2.1.18/FO841, Report of proceedings, 2.1.1918.
102 NAL/CO649/16-2.1.18/FO 841, FO to Hardinge, Madrid, Jan. 1918; NAL/CO649/16-24.1.18/
FO4454, FO to Merry del Val, 22.1.1918; NAL/CO649/16-24.1.18/FO4454, Graham (FO) to Lord
Bertie, Paris, 22.1.1918.
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Addressing the new Spanish Minister of State, Hardinge reiterated that the
Fernando Po internment was irreconcilable with Spanish neutrality, but Barrera
ignored instructions to transfer the troops to Bata, and German officers promised
the troops that they would remain on the island ‘in spite of any order fromMadrid,
until the moment came for their victorious return.’103
The tide appeared to change when German submarines appeared on the West
African coast in April 1918. New reports showed that large consignments of arms
had again been smuggled to the island.104 A British admiral in Sierra Leone warned
that a German attack was imminent, and a company of the Nigerian Regiment was
rushed to Victoria, on the Cameroon coast, to forestall a German landing.105 The
British Army Council remarked that the failure of Spain to disarm, repatriate or
effectively intern the German forces caused anxiety in the French and British colo-
nies on the mainland, ‘where the local forces are small and necessarily much
scattered.’106 Political instability in Spain exacerbated the general sense
of insecurity.
In Madrid, Paris and Rome, mounting pressure to remedy the volatile situation
on Fernando Po at last generated a promise from the Spanish Minister of State to
recall Barrera. The officer next in rank would take charge until a successor could
be sent. A new governor, to be appointed, would be repatriate the African troops.
‘More than this I could not get him to promise,’ Hardinge sighed.107 With barely
disguised sarcasm he addressed the new Spanish Minister of State, Eduardo Dato,
shortly afterwards: ‘You are no doubt about to inform us of the name of the new
Governor, as well as the measures (… ) no doubt already taken’ to intern
Ebermaier and repatriate the troops.108
Repatriation: a happy ending?
Although Barrera was not present, the repatriation of the German troops did not
commence until 1919, when it was initiated by the French administration in
Cameroun, and not by the Spanish authorities. The British, who had been so anx-
ious to have Barrera and the German officers removed from the island, left it
103 NAL/CO649/16-11.2.18/7709, Hardinge to Min. of State, 17.1.1918; NAL/CO649/16-8.2.18/7358,
Hardinge to Min. of State, 30.1.1919 (wrongly dated: should be 1918).
104 Referred to in e.g. NAL/CO649/15-4.11.18/57413/conf/WAFF, Lt. Dorrington to Lt. Comm. Douglas,
HQ Nigeria Regiment, 10.9.1918.
105 NAL/CO583/66/18327, Lugard to CO 14.4.1918; NAL/CO583/66/26664, Lugard to CO 29.4.1918,
cited in Osuntokun, ‘Anglo-Spanish relations’, 300.
106 NAL/CO649/16-18.4.18/19187, WO to FO, 18.4.1918.
107 NAL/CO649/16-26.3.18/15217, Downing Str. to under-SoS, Apr. 1918; NAL/CO649/16-22.4.18/
20011, FO to Hardinge, Bertie, Rodd (Rome), 20.4.1918; NAL/CO649/16-26.3.18/15217, Hardinge to
Balfour, 14.4.1918. The decision to recall Barrera was taken in March 1918, but was not effectuated
until after the submarine incident: NAL/CO 649/16-19.3.18/14057, copy of telegram from Hardinge to
FO, 15.3.1918.
108 NAL/CO649/16-18.4.18/19068, Hardinge to Dato, n.d. Plantation owners and traders on Fernando Po
protested Barrera’s recall in a petition to the Minister of State: J. Vicent, ‘El gobernador va a Espa~na,’
ABC (24.5.1918), 5-6.
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primarily to France to organise the repatriation, assuming (erroneously) that ‘the
number from our spheres is small’.109 With the military threat gone, the troops on
Fernando Po were no longer perceived as a British concern.
Barrera’s recall to Spain was brief, and clearly intended to appease the Allies. In
July 1918, shortly after being called to Spain to attend an ‘urgent government meet-
ing’, he was promoted to Navy Captain.110 He returned to the island in 1919,
remaining at his post until 1924. He did eventually organise the repatriation of
most of the troops by Spanish steamers, submitting progress reports to the new
administration in Cameroon.
Repatriation appears to have been uneventful if slow. Throughout 1919, Spanish
steamers plied the waters between Santa Isabel and Douala, whence the soldiers
were expected to make their way home.111 The Ciudad de Cadiz, for example, left
Santa Isabel on 16 October with the 10th and 12th companies, a total of 1889
men, women, children and servants.112 A week later, the Ciudad de Cadiz and the
Antonico repeated the journey, with 2138 people and their possessions on
board.113 Passengers received 2 days’ food rations. The final contingent of
Cameroonians—Yaounde chiefs and their followers—was not repatriated until
November 1920.114
The internment on Fernando Po had lasted far longer than anyone had expected.
In 1916, internees, German and Spanish authorities alike had been confident that
Cameroon would return to German control after a brief war. Not only had the war
lasted longer than anticipated, the internment had dragged on even beyond armis-
tice. When repatriation was finally launched in 1919, most internees greeted it with
relief and enthusiasm. A German Yaounde NCO probably spoke for many when—
already in 1916—he complained to visiting Captain Phillimore that this ‘was not a
black man’s war and had no interest for them [the native troops]; that they were
well-fed, well-paid and newly clothed (… ) but that they were homesick and
wanted to return.’115 In 1917, a Spanish petitioner from Fernando Po insisted that
the troops were on the island against their will. If they were consulted, he
109 NAL/CO649/18-17.4.19/23689, Comment from CO re. Hardinge to Romanones, 5.4.1919.
110 J. Mercader, ‘Noticias,’ LGE, XV:14 (25.6.1918), 134. Vicent, ‘El gobernador’. Barrera’s new title was
Capitan de Fragata.
111 Not all went home. Several Cameroonian villages (presumably Yaounde) were established near Bata by
former refugees wishing to avoid French rule: BBL/R1001/3991, Rena (?) to Reichmann, Bata,
17.9.1919. Some interned soldiers from Liberia and Sierra Leone joined their Cameroonian wives in
Cameroon (NAL/CO649/21-24.1.19/4256, translation of Barrera to Commissioner of French Republic
in Douala, 15.10.1919; NAL/CO 649/21-24.1.19/4256, idem, 20.10.1919).
112 NAL/CO649/21-24.1.19/4256, translation of Barrera to Commissioner of French Republic in Douala,
15.10.1919. The steamer carried 415 soldiers, 277 women, 72 children, 121 servants of the 12th com-
pany, and 487 soldiers, 334 women, 65 children, and 123 boys of the 10th company, also ‘a few sick
people’ from the hospital, accompanied by nurses and servants.
113 NAL/CO 649/21-24.1.19/4256, translation of Barrera to Commissioner of French Republic in Douala,
20.10.1919. On board were the 9th and 11th companies, and 28 sick people with followers.
114 The last 150 internees left Fernando Po on 28 Nov. 1920: ‘Noticias de la colonia,’ LGE, XVII:23
(10.12.1920), 219.
115 NAL/CO649/16-2.1.18/FO841, Report by Phillimore, 19.10.1916; NAL/CO649/8-20.11.16/55531,
Report by Sgt. Major A. Jacob in Stobart to CO, 18.10.1916.
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contended, ‘at least 10,000’ would choose to return to Cameroon.116 In the same
vein, an interned catechist exclaimed in exasperation in 1918 that he had been in
this place, of which he had never heard, for over 2 years, ‘and only God knows for
how much longer.’ Although his people were faring ‘as well as possible,’ they were
becoming impatient and wished to return home.117
Now, in October 1919, thousands of elated Cameroonians filed through Santa
Isabel en route to the harbour, ‘filling the air with jubilant song’ to the accompani-
ment of an impromptu band playing ‘rustical’ instruments.118 Business boomed
again briefly in Santa Isabel. In all, the returning troops and their followers carried
over 40,000 headloads and were accompanied by over two thousand hens, dogs,
cats, pigs, sheep, goats and horses.119
Not all Cameroonians looked forward to returning home. A Spanish report
noted ‘great unwillingness’ especially among the ‘non-interned natives’ to return
to Cameroon, probably referring to the civilian Yaounde refugees, or perhaps
to soldiers’ families and servants.120 Some preferred the relative peace of
Fernando Po, recalling strained relations in their home communities. Many
enjoyed a higher status—both in social and in economic terms—than they
would in their home villages. Perhaps some found it difficult to leave deceased
family members behind.121 Many preferred to work on cotton plantations on
the island, reluctant to return to Cameroon or to military life, whether German
or French.122 Hardinge observed that Spanish rule was ‘more easy-going’ than
German rule:123
The picture drawn by Se~nor Dato of the reformed savage warrior from Cameroon
joyfully picking cotton to protect his kindly Spanish employers against the effects of
116 NAL/CO649/16-24.1.18/FO4454, unknown Spanish correspondent, n.d. Some went to great lengths to
escape from the island. Over 100 Kru men, stranded after working on Spanish ships, tried to return
home as the war drew to a close, including seven who arrived in Victoria in a canoe in September
1918. They had boarded the Ciudad de Cadiz as deckhands at Monrovia in January, but were left in
Santa Isabel because the ship would not call at Monrovia on the return voyage. Together with 78 other
deck hands from Liberia, they had been put to work on plantations for subsistence pay (NAL/CO649/
14-4.11.18/57413/conf/WAFF, Lt. Dorrington to Lt. Comm. Douglas, HQ Nigeria Regiment,
10.10.1918). Later, a group of four Kru men tried to escape, also in a canoe. Two drowned. The others
were rescued by fishermen. These men had also been deckhands on the Ciudad de Cadiz. They were
stranded on Fernando Po for nearly three years. The Spanish government employed them as painters
(NAL/CO649/15-4.11.18/57413/conf/WAFF, Report by Lt. Dorrington, 27.9.1918).
117 Quoted in Hennemann, Werden und Wirken, 40–41. The catechist was also a judge in the native court
in his camp.
118 ‘De Santa Isabel’, LGE, XVI:20 (25.10.1919), 174–5; BNA/Tb(1920)3, Barrera to Commissioner of the
French Republic in Cameroun, 6.11.1919.
119 Ruiaz, ‘Epilogando una obra colonial,’ LGE, XVI:21 (10.11.1919), 178.
120 NAL/CO750/3-11.9.19/52954/destroyed, Despatch from Madrid, 11.10.1919.
121 As repatriation came to an end, 400 internees built a cemetery where they were allowed to bury their
dead free of charge. J. Mercader, ‘Noticias de Santa Isabel,’ LGE, XVI (10.6.1919), 121–2.
122 NAL/CO649/16-8.6.18/27871, Hardinge to FO, 1.6.1918; NAL/CO649/16-10.6.18/28253, Hardinge
to Balfour, 1.6.1918. Some suggest that internees were retained by force by Spanish authorities to work
on plantations: Osuntokun, ‘Relations’, 5.
123 NAL/CO649/16-10.6.18/28253, Hardinge to Balfour, 1.6.1918.
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the American blockade may perhaps sound a little idyllic, but if good wages are
given and the work is easy, need not be regarded as pure romance.124
Some were apparently pressured to return to Cameroon. Describing the last ship-
ment of Cameroonians to Douala in 1919, Barrera mentioned that ‘runaways are
still being collected’.125
When systematic repatriation started, thousands of Cameroonians had lived for
over three years in close contact with Europeans in a community organise along
German lines. The hierarchy in the camps differed from that at home; soldiers and
their families lived in a multi-cultural settlement under European leadership. The
recruits were organised in companies without reference to their ethnic back-
grounds.126 Social stratification and social mobility were based on criteria different
from those pertaining at home. The relative scarcity of elder men meant social and
political opportunities, but also competition, for younger men. Many acquired
money, goods, and women. Thousands learned to read and write. Over 3500
received baptism; thousands more became catechumens. The impact of the expos-
ure to Christianity in the camps was enormous, and set the soldiers even further
apart from their peers at home.127
On the mainland, the return of the ex-soldiers met with apprehension. The
troops were greatly feared, having a reputation for abuse of power.128 Many
returned home in their uniforms, which they were immediately instructed by the
British officials to shed.129 Many had been sent to war by their chiefs because they
were dissidents: their return refuelled old conflicts and altered the balance of power.
Insubordination was widespread, and returning soldiers took advantage of post-
war instability to establish their autonomy. Many returning soldiers contested both
traditional and British authority, often referring to Christian teachings. The British
prohibited German priests from returning to Cameroon, so ex-soldiers founded
and fostered Christian communities independently.130
124 Hardinge referred to difficulties encountered by Spain in obtaining cotton due to wartime conditions.
125 BNA/Tb(1920)3, Correspondence between Governor Spanish Guinea and French Commissary in
Cameroun. Whether willingly or not, many internees remained on Fernando Po. Yaounde and Hausa
were the most numerous immigrants on the island a decade after repatriation. In 1930 a large Yaounde
community occupied a settlement north-east of Santa Isabel, where one of the internment camps had
been situated. Local trade was in the hands of Hausa, most of whom had been servants of German offi-
cers: J. Arija, La Guinea Espan~nola y sus Riquezas (Estudios Coloniales) (Madrid: Espasa Calpe,
1930), 138–40.
126 K. Hausen, Deutsche Kolonialherrschaft in Afrika: Wirtschaftsinteressen und Kolonialverwaltung in
Kamerun vor 1914 (Freibourg, 1970), 136–7.
127 Many were baptized on the eve of repatriation, and were admonished to establish Christian commun-
ities in their villages. In addition to the two Herz Jesu priests Baumeister and Schuster, two Pallotine
priests (Zeus and Ruf), and some brothers worked in the camp mission: ‘Missionsrundschau:
Kamerun,’ Die Katholischen Missionen 1919/1920:7, 115. Ruf remained in Santa Isabel after the war
as procurator of the Catholic mission (NAL/CO649/20-10.9.20/45183, P.E. Ruf, 18.9.1919).
128 H.R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons: 1884–1914. A Case Study in Modern Imperialism (London,
1938), 197.
129 BNA/Ab1917/40, Station diary Bamenda, various entries 1919.
130 BNA/Sd1916/3, DO Crawford to Resident, 17.11.1919.
CAMEROONIAN SOLDIERS IN FERNANDO PO 299
Well into the 1930s, the British worried that German loyalties might pose a threat
to the British and French presence in Cameroon. These fears were not unfounded.
As late as March 1919, ex-Governor Ebermaier nurtured the idea of a German mili-
tary base on Fernando Po, reporting that German officers were travelling to
Fernando Po to release native troops from their old company formations, to equip
them, and to retrain them in new groups.131 With Barrera back in Santa Isabel,
Ebermaier could again rely on the Spanish administration turning a blind eye.
Concluding remarks
The impotence—and the enduring patience—of the Allies is striking. Ambasssador
Hardinge was reluctant to endanger relations with Spain, who in turn wished to
avoid aggravating Germany. ‘We can do nothing,’ the Colonial Office observed in
1918. ‘I suppose the French, who are also interested, are also holding their
hands.’132 Wartime neutrality was contested in Spain, and domestic political
instability plagued the administration.133 Clearly, when it came to prolonging the
internment, Barrera had support in Madrid. One wonders how much room for
manoeuvre he had on Fernando Po, with the large refugee population on the island
evidently under German control, and economic interests in both Spanish and
German hands.
In this article, the internment was primarily approached from the British perspec-
tive, simply because British sources were most readily accessible. Research in
Spanish and French archives and publications is called for, to clarify the Spanish
and French perspectives. Further study of German sources can be expected to shed
light on the German perspective: German authorities must have been aware of the
smuggling of large consignments of weapons. How were these organised and
financed?134 Another promising avenue is perhaps also the most challenging,
namely to look for the indigenous perspective.
A micro-perspective can sometimes further our understanding of the larger pic-
ture. In October 1919, some 400 ex-soldiers, 170 women, 50 children and 95 serv-
ants reached their homeland, Kom, in the Bamenda Grassfields, after a two-month
trek from Douala.135 Among them was Michael Timneng, who was introduced in
the opening of this article. Timneng had been a houseboy for a German priest also
interned on Fernando Po. His brother recalled:
News came to us that my brother and other soldiers were coming. My mother
prepared food and sent me to meet them on the way and welcome them. The Fon
131 BBL/R1001/3930, Ebermaier to Kolonialamt, 18.3.1919.
132 NAL/CO649/16-31.1.18/5910, Comment CO re. Hardinge to Balfour, 16.1.1918.
133 During the First World War, the government changed four times in Spain, and the fourth administration
collapsed a month after Germany’s capitulation in November 1918: Francisco J. Romero
Salvado, Spain 1914-1918: Between War and Revolution, London and New York, Routledge, 1999,
Chronology of Main Events; Charles H. Cunningham, ‘Spain and the War’, The American Political
Science Review, 1917; 11(3), 421-47.
134 In May 1918, Ebermaier commended Olshausen (German consul on Fernando Po) for enabling the sup-
ply of war needs despite the blockade: BBL/R1001/3930/Tel. 888, Kaiserliches Gouvernement Kamerun
(Madrid) to Kolonialamt Berlin, part 2, 23.5.1918.
135 BNA/Cb1918/2, Annual Report Bamenda Division, 1919, 9.
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[chief] had ordered that they come directly to the palace, bringing to him all the
war booty. (… )
At Laikom [the palace], the Fon came out to meet the soldiers. My brother did not
remove his cap. While he was talking, the Fon kept watching Timneng’s boots. My
brother told him it was a good thing to have been sent to be killed by the white man,
because instead of killing him the white man had taught him the ways of the true and
only God and had asked him to come back and preach his message to the Kom. He
showed the true God’s instructions [the catechism]. The Fon said it was a good thing,
but ordered that they bring him the war booty. He inquired why their shoes were so
large, and was told that they were used to kick people and break their bones and
skulls. The Fon requested the soldiers to remove their boots and uniforms, and leave
them at the palace. My brother swore an oath and told the Fon that could not be done.
It was the first time in Kom history that the Fon’s orders were denied to his face. 136
Years of political and social upheaval ensued, as Timneng and his followers
established a Catholic community which fundamentally challenged power relations
and gender relations in Kom. Such encounters were of course not unique to Kom.
The repatriation of such a large number of troops and hangers-on after such a
lengthy internment had a direct, destabilizing and lasting impact, in Kom and in
many other Cameroonian communities. Although the war was primarily a conflict
between European powers, its impact on post-war Cameroon history is manifest,
perhaps more in terms of local power relations than in terms of European adminis-
tration. This description of the internment and repatriation of some 20,000
Cameroonians illustrates the extent to which this localized impact has been under-
estimated in research on colonial rule.
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